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A B S T R A C T High-functioning children in the autism spectrum are
frequently noted for their impaired attention to facial expressions of
emotions. In this study, we examined whether attention to emotion
cues in others could be enhanced in children with autism, by varying
the relevance of children’s attention to emotion expressions. Twenty-
eight high-functioning boys with autism and 31 boys from a control
group were asked to sort photos depicting smiling or frowning faces
of adults. As found in earlier studies, in neutral conditions children
with autism were less attentive to emotion expressions than children
from a control group. This difference disappeared when children were
explicitly asked to make a socially relevant decision. These findings
suggest that the attention of children with autism to emotion
expressions in others is influenced by situational factors. Theoretical
implications of these findings are discussed.
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Reading others’ emotional expressions is essential to social interactions,
because this information helps to explain and anticipate other people’s
actions. Processing facial information is likely to be one of the earliest
facilitators of social engagements (Bushnell et al., 1989). According to
Darwin (1872), the recognition and understanding of basic emotional
expressions is an innate ability. Studies have indicated that, in normal
development, even very young infants spontaneously attend and discrimi-
natively react to emotional expressions in others. For example, neonates
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show recognition of qualitative differences in facial emotional expressions
and 10-week-old babies react appropriately to distinct expressions (Caron
et al., 1982; Izard, 1994; Klinnert et al., 1983). Although it is hard to estab-
lish to what extent such young babies fully understand these signals (Harris,
1989), these findings nevertheless imply that the processing of facial infor-
mation is one of the earliest means of social involvement.
In contrast to other mental processes, emotions are often visible in
facial expressions. As soon as children acknowledge that facial expressions
tend to reveal something about people’s inner states, attending to those
expressions may become a stepping-stone for the development of more
general ‘mind reading’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995). This refers to the ability to
attribute mental states (i.e. desires, which refer to wishes, hopes and needs,
and beliefs, which refer to thoughts, expectations, convictions and ideas) to
other people. Children who do not spontaneously attend to emotional
expressions in others will often miss information that can be crucial to
infer others’ desires and beliefs, which in turn will hamper their under-
standing of other people’s actions. Insight into other people’s mental states
is thought to emerge around 2 or 3 years of age, when children show
pretence or imagine psychological states (Harris, 1989). Mind reading
stresses the importance of emotional information and thereby stimulates
attention to emotional expressions even further (Hobson, 2002).
Due to their key role in social interactions, deficits in the perception of
emotions have long been thought – at least partially – to account for the
social disabilities that can be observed in children with autism spectrum
disorders. Kanner (1943) originally described the autistic condition as
insensitivity towards emotional expressiveness of others. Reduced attention
to facial expressions of emotions in participants with autism has been found
in various studies, in which participants were asked to sort or match emotion
or non-emotion photographs (Celani et al., 1999; Tantam et al., 1989), or
pair different modes of emotional expressions (Hobson, 1986; Hobson
et al., 1988). However, several other studies failed to find evidence for
impaired attention to emotions, in particular when the participants with and
without autism were matched on verbal intelligence (e.g. Braverman et al.,
1989; Ozonoff et al., 1990; Prior et al., 1990).
Generally, high-functioning children with autism seem to do well on
emotion recognition concerning the basic emotions of happiness, anger,
sadness and fear (Davies et al., 1994; Loveland et al., 1997), but have diffi-
culties when tasks involve more complex emotions, such as surprise (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1993), pride (Kasari et al., 1993), shame or embarrassment
(Capps et al., 1992; Heerey et al., 2003) and jealousy (Bauminger, 2004).
Moreover, when normally intelligent children with autism were compared
with mental age matched controls, attention deficits were found when the
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complexity of the tasks was increased. For example, presenting only the eye
region of facial expressions, or combining expressions with mismatching
emotion words, led to poorer performances in children with autism (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Grossmann et al., 2000).
Jennings (1974) used a different approach to investigate emotion
attention in low-functioning individuals with autism. Participants were
asked to categorize photographed human faces, which differed on both
non-emotion (e.g. hats) and emotion (facial expressions) features. The
children with autism categorized the faces more often on non-emotion
features than the control children. Elaborating on this experiment, Weeks
and Hobson (1987) varied not only the emotion but also the identity of
the depicted people, in order to test for emotion attention over different
individual facial structures. A similar preference for non-emotion features
was found in the majority of children with autism. However, both studies
also showed that these low-functioning participants with autism could sort
on the basis of emotion features when they were explicitly asked to do so.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that,
although they might not give the same priority to facial expressions as typi-
cally developing children, even in low-functioning children with autism
the ability to perceive emotional expressions seems to be essentially intact.
The question then is why, in these studies, children with autism used
this skill less than their typically developing peers. Possibly, the direct
relevance of facial emotional expressions played a role in those settings.
Participants usually construe their own reasons for focusing on certain
aspects of a task and comply with their expectations of the task’s demands
(Orne, 1969). The natural priority that is given to facial expressions by
typically developing children might stem from their acknowledgement that
emotional information is pertinent – or at least could become pertinent in
the near future – under almost all circumstances. Yet, participants in these
studies are not dealing with real people, nor are there usually any refer-
ences to future interactions. Therefore, a finding that children with autism
tend to ignore emotional expressions under these artificial circumstances
might indicate that they fail to apply their ability to read emotional
expressions in situations in which the value of such information is not
immediately manifest. Consequently, the results of the studies discussed
may provide data on children’s baseline attention to emotional expressions,
but they do not necessarily imply that children with autism fail to exhibit
attention to others’ emotions when situations directly require it – much
less that they are unable to attend to others’ emotions.
Other studies have also found that external ‘triggers’ can activate latent
abilities in children from the autism spectrum. Task performance of children
with autism, known for their low task motivation (Koegel and Mentis,
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1985), was enhanced when their task involvement increased. Children’s
performances improved, for example, when they were prompted by
explicit instructions, when their active task participation was reinforced, or
when their personal interest increased (Begeer et al., 2003; Dunlap, 1984;
Lewis and Boucher, 1988; O’Dell et al., 1983; Rieffe et al., 2000; Volden
et al., 1997). Therefore, the absence of social relevance in laboratory studies
using the traditional sorting method might cause a relative underestimation
of the ability to attend to emotion cues by children with autism. In this
study, in which we focus on high-functioning children with an autism
spectrum disorder, we examine (1) whether the frequently noted lack of
spontaneous attention to facial expressions can also be found within this
high-functioning subgroup, and (2) whether their attention to emotional
information improves when the situation contains some elements that may
prime the relevance of such information.
The current study included high-functioning (IQ > 80) children from
the autism spectrum and typically developing control children, and aimed
to compare children’s attention to emotions in a ‘neutral’ setting in which
the temporary feeling state of others did not have direct implications, and
in a setting where emotional information could have direct implications
for their own wellbeing. In both conditions, a sorting task was used, similar
to the experiment with low-functioning children with autism conducted
by Weeks and Hobson (1987). Children were presented with photographs
of people who differed according to their facial expression of emotions
(positive or negative), and two non-emotional features: moustaches and
glasses (present or absent). In the neutral condition, children were asked,
without any further explanation, to select pairs of photographs that were
‘most similar’. In the primed condition, children were asked to pair the
photos based on their expectations of the people’s future actions. The like-
lihood of these actions could easily be linked to basic action tendencies that
were part of the expressed emotions (e.g. people with positive emotional
expressions tend to be generous; people with negative emotional
expressions are more likely to punish you). Moreover, the actions that
children were asked about involved their own interests, because they were
asked to group the two people that they thought would act positively or
negatively towards them. This element of personal relevance was expected
to prompt their engagement and increase their task motivation. Therefore,
it was expected that the high-functioning children with autism in this
study would be less attentive to facial emotional expressions than their
typically developing peers in the neutral condition, but that children from
both groups would show an equal interest in emotional expressions in the
primed condition.
A U T I S M 10(1)
40
Method
Participants
Three groups of participants (all boys) were tested, two groups from the
autism spectrum and a control group. The first group included 11 boys
with classic autism (mean age 9:9, range 7:4 to 12:9), the second group
included 17 boys with PDD-NOS (mean age 9:1, range 7:3 to 11:9) and
the typically developing control group included 31 boys (mean age 9:6,
range 8:0 to 10:7). The children with autism and PDD-NOS were recruited
from a specialized child psychiatric centre providing both inpatient and
outpatient care for children with disorders in the autism spectrum. A
control group was recruited from two primary schools around Amsterdam,
The Netherlands.
The diagnostic classification of the children from the autism spectrum
was based on a 3 month diagnostic assessment by a child psychiatrist,
during which multiple informants, psychologists and educationalists, also
observed and tested the children in the group and in school. The children
with high-functioning autism showed a history of ‘classical’ autism and
fulfilled established diagnostic criteria according to the DSM-IV. Children
were classified as PDD-NOS when they met three or more criteria for
autistic disorder according to the DSM-IV, and when their impairments had
an onset before the age of 36 months, but the full set of criteria of an
autistic disorder were not met (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
The verbal (mean 99.8, SD 16.0) and non-verbal IQ (mean 94.4, SD 17.3)
of the children were within the ‘normal’ range, based on the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children–III (Wechsler, 1991) or the RAKIT intelli-
gence test (Bleichrodt et al., 1993). The autism subgroups of children with
PDD-NOS and autism did not differ on verbal and non-verbal IQ. The typi-
cally developing control group was not explicitly tested for their intelli-
gence. However, they functioned at an adequate level in regular elementary
schools, and according to their teachers they showed intelligence within
the ‘normal’ range.
Materials
The experiment consisted of four trials, two trials per condition (neutral
and primed). During each trial, using a laptop computer, children were
presented with combinations of four black-and-white photographs
showing male faces. The neutral condition consisted of the first two trials,
whereas the primed condition consisted of the last two trials.
After an introduction to make them familiar with the sorting procedure
(see ‘Procedure’), children were instructed as follows: ‘That went very well.
Now we will do a very similar game. I’ll show you pictures of four people.
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These pictures are different in some ways, and the same in other ways, just
like the previous task. You may choose again which two of the four pictures
are most similar according to you.’ This was repeated in the second trial
with another set of photos.
In the third trial, the positive primed condition, children were
instructed as follows: ‘Now, I will show you four pictures again. But this
time I want to ask you something different. Which two would be most
likely to give you a sweet?’ In the fourth trial, the negative primed
condition, children were asked: ‘Imagine all of the men in the pictures are
teachers. Which two teachers are most likely to tell you off?’
The photograph combinations were randomly chosen from a database
containing a total of 49 photos of 16 different individuals. Each child was
presented with random photo combinations of four different individuals.
For each presentation, the photos were arranged in such a way that any
categorization of two photos would correspond to one of three possible
selection features: glasses (present or absent), moustache (present or absent)
and valence of emotional expression (happy or angry). The common feature
of the two photos chosen by the subject in the first presentation (e.g. a
subject chooses two faces with glasses) was subsequently entered in the
computer by the experimenter. The computer then automatically created a
second random combination of four different photos that were equal on the
feature selected after the first presentation (i.e. no one wore glasses this
time). After this combination was displayed in a second presentation, again
two photos could be paired based on one of the two remaining features (i.e.
moustache and emotional expression). Each trial included two presentations
and the total amount of presentations was eight. The computer program was
written for the purpose of this experiment.
The photos were taken from the Yale Faces database (Belhumeur et al.,
1997). Weeks and Hobson (1987) reported interpretive problems due to
a high salience of a non-emotion feature (gender). To ensure an equal
distribution of salience among the selection features in the present exper-
iment, we conducted a pilot study among college students (n = 15) in
which the salience of selection features was judged for different combina-
tions of four photographs. The combinations that evoked equal distri-
butions of common features in the selected pairs (i.e. moustache, glasses
and emotional expression were chosen as selection criteria with equal
frequency) were used in the actual experiment.
Procedure
A male experimenter tested the participants individually for about 15
minutes. First of all, a training task was presented, designed to illustrate the
principle of the actual task. Four geometric figures were shown, which
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differed on three features: shape (square/rectangle), colour (grey/black)
and size (big/small). Participants were asked to select two figures that were
most similar according to them, in the following way: ‘We’ll play a game
now. I will show you four pictures of figures. All you have to do is tell me
which two pictures are most similar according to you.’ Children had two
opportunities to select pairs of figures. When children paired two figures
containing feature X, indicating their first preference for that feature, the
next presentation of figures would consist of four figures varying only with
respect to the remaining two features. Children were asked again to select
two similar figures. The next pair that was selected revealed children’s
second preference among the three features, as well as their least preferred
feature. During this training, participants did not need to verbalize which
features the pairs had in common. This training procedure was practised
twice. The actual experiment followed the exact same procedure, but
photographs of faces replaced the geometric figures.
Following the scoring system designed by Weeks and Hobson (1987),
children received a score of 2 when they selected two faces with similar
emotional expressions during the first presentation of three selection
features (direct emotion selection). A choice of faces with similar emotional
expressions during the second presentation with two criteria to choose from
was scored 1. Children who gave no priority to emotional expressions at
all were scored 0 (no emotion selection). Children’s scores over two trials
for each condition could thus vary from 0 to 4.
Results
All children understood the sorting procedure of the geometric figures on
different features in the introductory task and were admitted to participate
in the second part of the study. Table 1 shows the frequencies of children’s
emotion selections as a function of group (autism and control) and
condition (neutral and primed).
A clear majority of the children with autism and nearly half of the
control group never sorted the photographs they were presented with on
the basis of the emotional expression in the first two trials. Children with
autism sorted the photos less often on the basis of the emotion expressions
than children from the control group in the neutral condition. A non-para-
metric Mann–Whitney U-test confirmed this finding (U = 328.5, p < 0.05,
one-tailed).
The primed condition evoked more attention to emotional expressions
in both groups and all children sorted the photos at least once on their
emotional expression. As predicted, no group difference was found in this
primed condition. Children with autism showed attention to the facial
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emotional expressions of the people in the photos as frequently as children
from the control group (U = 378.0, p = 0.16, one-tailed). Children’s
attention to positive or negative emotional expressions was also analysed
separately. No group differences were found in attention to positive
(happy) (U = 411.0, n.s.) or negative (angry) (U = 354.5, n.s.) emotions
of children with autism and typically developing children.
These results indicate that the explicit addition of social relevance to
the instructions resulted in equivalent performances between the clinical
and the non-clinical groups. However, based on Table 1 it is unclear
whether the priming condition led to similar incremental or discrete
increases in preference scores for all children. Therefore, we calculated
increment scores between the neutral and primed conditions for each
child. The frequency of increment scores in Table 2 shows that approxi-
mately one-third of the children in both groups did not select on emotion
A U T I S M 10(1)
44
Table 1 Frequency of responses in which emotion was used as selection
criterion as a function of group (autism and control) and condition
Emotion priority in selection
4 3 2 1 0
Neutral condition*
Autism group (n = 28) 2 (7%) 1 (3%) 3 (11%) 3 (11%) 19 (68%)
Control group (n = 31) 4 (13%) 4 (13%) 4 (13%) 5 (16%) 14 (45%)
Primed condition
Autism group (n = 28) 16 (57%) 6 (22%) 4 (14%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%)
Control group (n = 31) 22 (71%) 4 (13%) 3 (10%) 2 (6%) 0 (0%)
*Between-group difference, p < 0.05.
Scores: 4 = emotion selection after first presentation of both trials, 3 = emotion selection after first
presentation of one trial and second presentation of other trial, 2 = emotion selection after first
presentation of one trial or after second presentations of both trails, 1 = emotion selection after
second presentation of one trial, 0 = no emotion selection.
Table 2 Frequency of increase in emotion selection between neutral and
primed condition as a function of group
Increase in emotion priority in selection
–1 0 1 2 3 4
Autism group 0 (0%) 2 (7%) 4 (14%) 7 (25%) 6 (21%) 9 (32%)
(n = 28)
Control group 2 (7%) 5 (16%) 4 (13%) 6 (19%) 3 (10%) 11 (36%)
(n = 31) 
in the neutral condition, but immediately did so in a primed condition
(increment is 4). Almost one-quarter (23 percent) of control children did
not show any increment or even showed a decrease.
The results in Table 1 do not reveal the different ways in which a child
could receive a score of 2 or 3. For instance, a score of 2 was given for
selecting on emotion expressions after one first presentation, but also for
selecting on emotion after two second presentations. As can be seen in
Table 3, the number of direct, indirect and absent emotion selections of
children with autism and controls are relatively similar in the primed
condition, but differ in the neutral condition. Children with autism more
often than the controls failed to select on emotion alone in the neutral
condition (U = 328.5, p < 0.05, one-tailed). None of the other frequen-
cies of emotion selections differed between groups.
Besides differences in attention to emotional features, we predicted a
higher degree of salience for the moustaches than the glasses in the autism
group. Earlier studies have shown that high-functioning children with
autism recognize facial information from the mouth regions better than
information from the eye regions (Joseph and Tanaka, 2003; Langdell,
1978). However, in the present experiment, no group differences were
found in preferential patterns for eye regions (i.e. glasses, U = 365.5, p =
0.27) or mouth regions (i.e. moustaches, U = 432.5, p = 0.98).
Although no explicit hypotheses were formulated with respect to the
subgroups within the autism spectrum, an extra analysis was carried out
in order to explore possible differences between children with autism
(n = 11) and PDD-NOS (n = 17). No differences were found in either the
neutral or the primed condition (see Table 4).
Finally, in order to control for a possible relationship between the atten-
tion to facial emotional expressions and intelligence levels, we correlated
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Table 3 Mean frequency of direct, indirect or no emotion selections as a
function of group
Emotion selection
Direct (after first Indirect (after No emotion selection
presentation) second presentation)
Neutral condition
Autism group (n = 28) 6 (11%) 8 (14%) 42 (75%)
Control group (n = 31) 13 (21%) 15 (24%) 34 (55%)
Primed condition
Autism group (n = 28) 40.5 (72%) 8.5 (15%) 7 (13%)
Control group (n = 31) 50 (81%) 6.5 (10%) 5.5 (9%)
the measures of both variables in the autism spectrum group. The correla-
tions between attention to emotions and verbal intelligence scores (primed
condition, r(28) = –0.28, n.s.; non-primed condition, r(28) = –0.17, n.s.)
or non-verbal intelligence scores (primed condition, r(28) = –0.03, n.s.;
non-primed condition, r(28) = 0.15, n.s.) did not reach significance level.
Discussion
In correspondence with the results of Weeks and Hobson (1987), who
studied low-functioning children with autism, the present experiment
showed that high-functioning children from the autism spectrum also paid
little attention to facial emotional expressions in other people. The current
group of children from the autism spectrum gave less priority to emotion
features as a selection criterion for the photographed faces than their typi-
cally developing peers. Instead, they more often selected photographs that
were similar on non-emotion features, such as the presence of glasses or a
moustache. However, this group difference only appeared in the ‘neutral’
condition, when circumstances bore no relation to possible relevance of
emotional factors.
As expected, this difference between the autism spectrum and control
groups disappeared when children were asked to focus on likely behav-
ioural outcomes of the expressed emotion states. Children from both
groups equally often sorted the presented photographs on emotion features
when they were asked to select them according to possible future actions
of the portrayed people. These findings suggest that children with autism
are able to pair a positive or negative facial expression with a positive or
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Table 4 Frequency of responses in which emotion was used as selection
criterion as a function of group (autism and PDD-NOS) and condition
Emotion priority in selection
4 3 2 1 0
Neutral condition
Autism group (n = 11) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 9 (82%)
PDD-NOS group (n = 17) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 2 (12%) 3 (18%) 10 (59%)
Primed condition
Autism group (n = 11) 6 (55%) 1 (9%) 3 (27%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%)
PDD-NOS group (n = 17) 10 (59%) 5 (29%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%)
Scores: 4 = emotion selection after first presentation of both trials, 3 = emotion selection after first
presentation of one trial and second presentation of other trial, 2 = emotion selection after first
presentation of one trial or after second presentations of both trails, 1 = emotion selection after
second presentation of one trial, 0 = no emotion selection.
negative social consequence when asked to make a socially relevant
decision. Yet, whereas most typically developing children were attentive to
emotional expressions in both conditions, children with autism seemed
only to take them into full account when the relevance of the emotional
expressions was triggered by situational determinants. The variability of
performances in both groups of children highlights the impact of task
demands on children’s attention to emotional expressions.
An important question is whether the present results could be
attributed to differences in intellectual abilities between children with
autism and typically developing children. Unfortunately, we could not
directly answer this question since intelligence levels were not formally
assessed in the control group. However, the existence of this relation seems
unlikely in the present study. First, no correlations were found between the
intellectual abilities and attention to emotions in the autism spectrum
group, despite the fact that the variance of IQ scores in the autism group
was relatively high. These results are in line with the lack of correlation
between cognitive abilities and recognition of self-conscious emotions in
a recent study of normally intelligent children with autism (Heerey et al.,
2003). Furthermore, teachers who selected the control children were asked
to choose average students, and the mean IQ scores of the autism group
were indeed average. However, the lack of information on the intellectual
abilities of the control group means that caution is required in the
interpretation of the results of the present study.
The tendency of typically developing children to process emotional
information under all circumstances – even when the situational context
fails to show a direct relevance – suggests an automatic mechanism
(Darwin, 1872). As argued in the introduction, infant behaviour suggests
that children already intuitively understand some of these processes from
the beginning of life (Caron et al., 1982). It is difficult to determine from
our results whether children from the autism spectrum also have this kind
of intuitive understanding or recognition. If they do, however, this recog-
nition seems to have less impact if it is not explicitly required by the situ-
ation. Children with autism might naturally ignore other people’s facial
expressions when there is no direct need for them to deal with this kind
of information. However, they also seem to be less aware that others’
emotional states might become relevant. They do not seem to have acquired
the knowledge that the chance that this will happen is relatively high
compared to the possibility that knowledge about trivial elements like
glasses or moustaches will become useful.
On the other hand, one could also argue that, even after attention to
emotions is triggered in children with autism, their style of processing
emotional information might differ fundamentally from typically developing
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children. In particular, high-functioning children with autism are often
said to compensate for their lack of ‘natural’ attention to emotions by
cognitive means, sometimes referred to as the logico-affective hypothesis
(Hermelin and O’Connor, 1985). Within this approach, it could be argued
that the high-functioning children have sufficient intellectual skills to
appreciate the functions of emotional expressions and attend to the social
information that is contained within them. Their processing style can be
considered as ‘analytic and verbally mediated’ rather than ‘holistic and
intuitive’ (Grossman et al., 2000), and this may be related to weak central
coherence. These children have been observed to exhibit problems integrat-
ing information into a meaningful whole (Frith, 2003; Happé, 1994).
Indirect empirical support for a relation between weak central coherence
and face processing can be seen in the finding that children with autism
read emotional expressions more quickly than typically developing children
when faces are presented upside-down (Hobson et al., 1988; Langdell,
1978), suggesting a piecemeal rather than holistic processing of facial
information. Based on the present study, a decisive answer on the nature
of the processing style of emotional expressions in children with autism
cannot be provided. The same study carried out with low-functioning
children might provide more insight into this issue.
Earlier findings of a preference for mouth over eye regions in face
processing of children with autism (e.g. Joseph and Tanaka, 2003) were
not confirmed in the present study. However, our task may not have been
sensitive enough to illuminate these differences, as we did not use eye-
track technology to measure the visual fixations of the children.
Nevertheless irrespective of the exact manner in which they process
information about emotions, even in these intellectually able children with
autism, attention to emotions was triggered less spontaneously than in
their typically developing peers. The substantial increase of attention to
emotions in the priming condition suggests that the addition of social
relevancy to the task resulted in a qualitative shift to a new set of processing
criteria rather than enhancing a strategy that was already being employed.
This indicates a production deficit in the autism group: these children are
neither blind nor shortsighted to emotional cues, but they do need assist-
ance in deciding when and where to look. It also raises the question of
whether subgroups of children differ in their sensitivity to social priming,
especially with respect to interventions.
The problem remains that it will be hard to provide the children with
explicit instructions about how to make use of emotional expressions in
ambiguous social situations, as is often the case in daily life situations.
Besides clarifying these contextual factors, a further goal would be to
indicate, and possibly facilitate, the kinds of social and interpersonal
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experiences in children with autism that make emotional expressions auto-
matically salient in typical development. Without a clearly defined context,
as was the case in the neutral condition, we can conclude that emotional
expressions are no more meaningful than glasses or moustaches to children
with autism. Frith recently argued that all three major approaches to autism
can be unified by supposing a different kind of self-awareness in autism:
‘an awareness that is all self and does not include the reflection of the self
in other selves’ (2003, p. 210). Awareness of and attention to emotional
reactions in other people are essential elements in this missing ‘looking
glass self’ (Cooley, 1902).
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